Rabbi
Yitzchak Breitowitz
Associate professor of law at
University of
Maryland.
JEWISH LAW AND CHILD CUSTODY
ANSWER: The
Talmud,Ketubot 65b,
lays down down a number of rules concerning the
adjudication of custody disputes.:1)children below six are
to be placed with the mother although the father continues
to be liable for their support;2)boys above the age of six
are to be placed with their fathers;3)girls above the age
of six are to be placed with their mothers.Despite the
seemingly-absolute nature of these directives,halachic
authorities are unanimous in
regarding them at most as rebuttable presumptions
or guidelines
to be superseded or ignored when their application would
be inconsistent with the child’s welfare. De facto ,therefore,Jewish
law does regard welfare of the child as the primary factor
for consideration. This,however,does not mean that the
halachic standard
is identical to
that employed under secular law.This divergence may stem
from two distinct factors:.
(1)The Evidence Needed to Rebut the
Talmudic Presumption: There are two schools of thought
concerning the
rebuttal of the
Talmudic presumptions.Some authorities(Approach
#1) take the position that the Talmudic rules must
apply unless the parent
who would be awarded custody under
those rules can be shown to be unfit..For
example,custody of boys over six must go to the father
even where it is clear that the mother is the better
parent unless
the father can be shown to be unfit.See,for example,R.
Ovadiah
Hedaya,Yaskil Avdi EH 2:2(4).Other authorities(Approach
#2)-and this has tended to be the position of the Rabbinical Courts
in Israel-apply the Talmudic presumptions only where both
parents are equally fit(which is rare) ;where that is not
the case, they
will award custody based exclusively on the “best interest
of the child”.Indeed,on occasion this has led to a child
being placed with neither
parent where a third party,eg,grandparent,was regarded as
the best caregiver See Piskei Din Rabaniim
1:55-56 and 3:353..Professor
Michael Broyde,an authority who has written extensively on
this topic,,has argued that these two views depend on
whether one regards custody determinations
as matters of parental rights akin to
property(subject to forfeiture in the event of unfitness)
or as matters concerned exclusively with what is best for
the child
See Broyde,”Child Custody in Jewish
Law”,. 37
Journal of Halacha and Contemporary
Society
27(1997)These
same tensions and polarities exist in secular domestic
relations law as well which has gradually replaced a model
based on property rights with one based predominantly
though not exclusively on children’s welfare. Thus,while
both halachic approaches deny custody to an unfit
parent,,only
Approach #2
is
conceptually identical to the standard employed in modern
secular law.
(2)Differing Standards for the
Determination of Fitness:It must be emphasized that
even where the tests are in principle the same,a custody
award of a beit din will often not be identical to that of
a secular court.In determining whether a parent is fit
or the most fit (depending on the standard),a beit
din will look at many factors that a secular court may
simply regard as irrelevant.. For example,a parent who
does not practice Judaism or who is not willing to give
their child any type of jewish religious education would
almost certainly be regarded as unfit within the standards
of Jewish law regardless of his/her suitability in all
other respects.It is almost definitionally not in the best
interests of a Jewish child to be raised in a non-Jewish
environment absent
issues of abuse and the like
.From a secular perspective at least if the child
is too young
to have formed an attachment,a difference in religious
perspective between the parents does not tip the balance
one way or the other and the custodial award is likely to
be made on the basis of other factors..
It should also be noted that, as a matter of
halacha, parties are obligated to submit disputes
concerning child custody and visitation to a beit din and
must abide by the beit din’s decision.As a matter of
secular law,the decision of a beit din on
custody/visitation/support is not legally enforceable
because courts in
their capacity as defenders of children reserve the right
to make their own independent assessment of what is in the
children’s best interest and will not defer to the
determination of an alternative body, even
a body that the
parties had accepted as
having binding authority to make the decision. In
theory,therefore,a party unsatisfied with the beit din’s
decision might be able to successfully overturn it in
secular court
.Such an effort ,however,whether ultimately
successful or not,
is a serious violation of halacha and a descration
of G-d’s name.See commentary of
Rashi ,Exodus 21:1.
From the beit
din’s perspective,
the more
professional its deliberations
are,the more complete the evidentiary record is,the more
likely a court will view its decision with favor.The beit
din should thus
be encouraged to utilize resources of
psychologists,social workers,and other mental health and
family professionals both
to insure the greater accuracy of its decision and to
maximize the probability that its decision will be legally
recognized and enforced.
END
OF DOCUMENT
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